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Abstract
We analyse scenarios in which individually rational agents negotiate with
each other in order to agree on deals to exchange resources. We consider
two variants of the framework, one where agents can use money to com-
pensate other agents for disadvantageous deals, and another one where
this is not possible. In both cases, we analyse what types of deals are
necessary and sucient to guarantee an optimal outcome of negotiations.
We also show how these conditions can change depending on properties
of the utility functions used by agents to represent the values they ascribe
to certain sets of resources.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we analyse negotiation scenarios where agents exchange resources
in order to increase their respective individual welfare. We are not concerned
with any specic protocols or even strategies here, but rather with the patterns
of exchanges agents could possibly agree on and to what extent these patterns
are sucient or necessary to guarantee optimal outcomes of negotiations. One
central assumption that we do make with respect to the strategies that agents
follow is that they are individually rational in the sense that they will never
accept a disadvantageous deal. In the rst instance, we consider the outcome
of a negotiation to be optimal whenever it results in an allocation of resources
with maximal social welfare (the sum of values ascribed by all agents to the
resources they hold in that situation).
A very similar framework has been studied by Sandholm in [5] and elsewhere,
mostly in the context of agents negotiating in order to reallocate tasks. In fact,
much of the rst half of this paper amounts to a review of [5] using a terminology
appropriate for resource allocation problems (rather than task contracting). One
of the central aspects of Sandholm's framework is that agents can use money to
compensate other agents for accepting (otherwise) disadvantageous deals. We
extend this framework here to also model negotiations over resources where no
1money changes hands. For these scenarios we cannot always guarantee that a
negotiation will culminate in an allocation with maximal social welfare. Instead,
we study conditions for outcomes that are at least Pareto optimal.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we dene
our resource allocation problems as well as important notions such as individual
rationality, deal, and social welfare. Section 3 discusses sucient and neces-
sary conditions for optimal outcomes of negotiations in the original framework
with money and Section 4 does the same for the framework without money.
Section 5 is a preliminary account of results for domains with specic charac-
teristics (that is, specic classes of utility functions). Finally, we conclude with
a brief discussion of ideas for future work in this area.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we dene the various components of the kind of negotiation
scenario we are interested in. Negotiation occurs in a system (A;R) where A is
a nite set of agents and R is a nite set of (discrete) resources.
Utility functions. The value an agent i ascribes to a particular set of re-
sources R will be modelled by means of a utility function, that is, a function
from sets of resources (subsets of R) to real numbers. This could really be any
such function, i.e. the utility ascribed to a set of resources is not just the sum
of the values ascribed to its elements. The interesting aspect of this is that
we can model the fact that utility may strongly depend on context, i.e. what
other resources the agent holds at the same time. (We are going to discuss more
specic classes of utility functions in Section 5.)
Allocations. An allocation of resources is a partitioning of the available re-
sources amongst the agents in the system. That is, an allocation for the
system (A;R) is a function A from agents in A to subsets of R such that
A(i) \ A(j) = fg for i 6= j and
S
i2A A(i) = R.
Resource allocation problems. A resource allocation problem is a quadru-
ple (A;R;U;A0) where A is a nite set of (at least two) agents, R is a nite set
of resources, U = fui : 2R ! R j i 2 Ag is a collection of utility functions, and
A0 is an initial allocation of resources for the system (A;R).
A solution to a resource allocation problem is a particular allocation for the
system in question that is, in a sense to be made precise, optimal.
Social welfare. A utility function ui is a mapping from sets of resources to
numerical values. The utility of an agent i for a given allocation A is the value
of its utility function for the set of resources it holds in that situation. We
abbreviate ui(A) = ui(A(i)).
2The social welfare sw(A) of the agent society as a whole for a given allocation
A is dened as the sum of the values of the utility functions of all the agents in
the society for that allocation:1
sw(A) =
X
i2A
ui(A)
Rather unsurprisingly, we say that an allocation A has maximal social welfare
for a given system (A;R) i there is no other allocation A0 for that system
such that sw(A) < sw(A0) holds. Maximal social welfare is our rst optimality
criterion (a second one will be discussed in Section 4).
Deals. Agents can negotiate deals to exchange resources in order to improve
their respective welfare. An example would be: \I give you r1 if you give me r2
and r3". In the most general case, any numbers of agents and resources could
be involved in a single deal. From an abstract point of view, a deal takes us
from one allocation of resources to the next. In that sense, we may characterise
a deal as a pair of allocations  = (A;A0) with A 6= A0. That is, deal  is only
applicable in situation A and will result in situation A0. It species for each
resource in the system whether it is to remain where it is or where it is to be
moved to, respectively.
Less formally, we will, for instance, speak about the `deal' whereby agent i
hands resource r over to agent j. In fact, such a transaction really identies the
class of all deals that involve resource r being moved from agent i to j while all
other resources remain where they are.
Individual rationality. Our agents are self-interested in the sense that they
will only propose or accept deals that strictly increase their individual welfare.
We call a deal individually rational i it increases the welfare of all the agents
involved in it. A deal may be accompanied by a payment to compensate some of
the partners for accepting a loss in utility. Rather than specifying for each pair
of agents how much money the former pays to the latter, we simply say how
much money each single agent pays or receives. Formally, a payment function
p is a function from A to R such that
P
i2A p(i) = 0. Here, p(i) > 0 means
that agent i pays the amount of p(i), while p(i) < 0 means that it receives the
amount of  p(i).
We can now give a formal denition of individual rationality: A deal  =
(A;A0) is individually rational i there exists a payment function p such that
ui(A0)   ui(A) > p(i) for all i 2 A, except possibly p(i) = 0 for agents i with
A(i) = A0(i) (i.e. for agents not aected by the deal). That is, agent i will be
prepared to accept  i it has to pay less than its gain in utility or i it will
get paid more than its loss in utility, respectively. Usually, there will be a range
of possible payments. How agents manage to agree on a particular one is not
a matter of consideration at the abstract level at which we are discussing this
1As the amount of money present in the system stays constant throughout the negotiation
process, it makes sense not to take it into account for the evaluation of social welfare.
3framework here. We assume that a deal will go ahead as long as there exists
some suitable payment function p.
Types of deals. Following Sandholm [5], we can distinguish a number of
deal types. The simplest deals are one-resource-at-a-time deals where a single
resource is passed on from one agent to another one. Deals where one agent
passes a set of resources on to another agent are called cluster deals. The
following example shows that one-resource-at-a-time deals alone are not always
sucient to guarantee the optimal outcome of a negotiation:
Agent 1 Agent 2
A0(1) = fr1;r2g A0(2) = fg
u1(fg) = 0 u2(fg) = 0
u1(fr1g) = 2 u2(fr1g) = 3
u1(fr2g) = 3 u2(fr2g) = 3
u1(fr1;r2g) = 7 u2(fr1;r2g) = 8
Social welfare for the initial allocation A0 is 7, but it could be 8, namely if
agent 2 had both resources. However, the only possible one-resource-at-a-time
deals would be to pass either r1 or r2 from agent 1 to agent 2. In either case,
the loss in utility incurred by agent 1 (5 or 4, respectively) would outweigh the
gain of agent 2 (3 for either deal), so there is no payment function that would
make these deals individually rational. The cluster deal of passing fr1;r2g from
agent 1 to 2, on the other hand, would be individually rational if agent 2 paid
agent 1 an amount of, say, 7:5.
Deals where one agent gives a single item to another agent who returns
another single item are called swap deals. Sometimes it can also be necessary to
exchange resources between more than just two agents. A multiagent deal is a
deal that could involve any number of agents, where each agent passes at most
one resource to each of the other agents taking part. Similarly to the example
above, we can also construct scenarios where swap deals or multiagent deals are
necessary (i.e. where cluster deals alone would not be sucient to guarantee
maximal social welfare). This also follows from Theorem 2, which we are going
to prove in the next section.
Finally, deals that combine the features of the cluster and the multiagent
deal type are called combined deals. These could involve any number of agents
and any number of resources. In other words, every deal  (according to our
abstract denition given above) is a combined deal.
3 Resource Allocation with Money
In this section, we rephrase the main results obtained by Sandholm [5] (on nec-
essary and sucient contract types in task-oriented domains) using the termi-
nology of our resource allocation problems. The following lemma, which states
that a deal is individually rational i it increases social welfare, will simplify the
proofs of the subsequent theorems.
4Lemma 1 (Individual rationality and social welfare) A deal  = (A;A0)
is individually rational i sw(A) < sw(A0).
Proof. `)': By denition,  = (A;A0) is individually rational i there exists a
payment function p with ui(A0)   ui(A) > p(i) for all i 2 A, except possibly
p(i) = 0 in case A(i) = A0(i). If we add up the inequations for all i 2 A we get: P
i2A(ui(A0)   ui(A)) >
P
i2A p(i). By denition of a payment function, the
righthand side equates to 0 while, by denition of social welfare, the lefthand
side equals sw(A0)   sw(A), i.e. we really get sw(A) < sw(A0) as claimed.
`(': Now let sw(A) < sw(A0). We are done if we can show that there exists
a payment function p such that ui(A0) ui(A) > p(i) for all i 2 A. The function
p with p(i) = ui(A0) ui(A) 
sw(A
0) sw(A)
jAj meets this requirement (because of
sw(A) < sw(A0)) and
P
i2A p(i) = 0, i.e. p really is a payment function. 2
Sucient deal types. The following theorem is equivalent to Sandholm's
result regarding the suciency of the combined contract type [5, Prop. 10].
Theorem 1 (Sucient deals for maximal social welfare) Any sequence
of combined deals (with money) that are individually rational will culminate
in a resource allocation with maximal social welfare.
Proof. By Lemma 1, any individually rational deal will strictly increase
social welfare. Hence, as the number of distinct allocations is nite, nego-
tiation will terminate after a nite number of deals. Now, for the sake of
contradiction, assume negotiation terminates with a non-optimal allocation
A, i.e. there exists another allocation A0 with sw(A) < sw(A0). But then, by
Lemma 1, the deal  = (A;A0) would be individually rational and thereby
possible, which contradicts our assumption of A being a terminal allocation. 2
At rst sight, this result may seem almost trivial. The notion of a combined
deal is a very powerful one. A single deal of this type allows for any number of
resources to be moved between any number of agents. From this point of view,
it is not particularly surprising that we can always reach an optimal allocation
(even in just a single step!). Furthermore, nding a suitable combined deal is
a very complex task, which may not always be viable in practice. But the true
power of Theorem 1 is in the ne print: any sequence of deals will culminate in
an optimal allocation. That is, whatever deals are agreed on in the early stages
of the negotiation, the system will never get stuck in a local optimum and nding
an allocation with maximal social welfare remains an option throughout. Given
the restriction to deals that are individually rational for all the agents involved,
social welfare must increase with every single deal. Therefore, negotiation al-
ways pays o, even if it has to stop early due to computational limitations.
(Andersson and Sandholm [1] have conducted a number of experiments on the
sequencing of certain contract/deal types to obtain the best possible allocations
within a limited amount of time.)
5Necessary deal types. The following theorem is equivalent to Sandholm's
main result regarding necessary contract types [5, Prop. 11]. All other nd-
ings on the insuciency of certain types of contracts reported in [5] may be
considered corollaries to this.
Theorem 2 (Necessary deals for maximal social welfare) Let the sets
of agents and resources be xed. Then for every deal  there is a resource alloca-
tion problem with money such that  is necessary to reach a resource allocation
with maximal social welfare.
Proof. Given a set of agents A and a set of resources R, let  = (A;A0) with
A 6= A0 be any deal for this system. We need to show that there are a collection
of utility functions U and an initial allocation such that  is necessary to reach
an allocation with maximal social welfare. This would be the case if A0 had
maximal social welfare, A had the second highest social welfare, and A was the
initial allocation of resources. As we have A 6= A0, there must be an agent j 2 A
such that A(j) 6= A0(j). We now x utility functions ui for agents i 2 A and
sets of resources R  R as follows:
ui(R) =
8
<
:
2 if R = A0(i) or (R = A(i) and i 6= j)
1 if R = A(i) and i = j
0 otherwise
We get sw(A0) = 2jAj, sw(A) = sw(A0) 1, and sw(B) < sw(A) for any other
allocation B. That is, A0 is the (unique) allocation with maximal social welfare
and the only allocation with higher social welfare than A. Therefore, if we make
A the initial allocation then  = (A;A0) would be the only deal increasing social
welfare. By Lemma 1, this means that  would be the only individually rational
(and thereby the only possible) deal. Hence,  is indeed necessary to achieve
maximal social welfare. 2
Unlimited money. An implicit assumption made in the framework that we
have presented so far is that every agent has got an `unlimited' amount of money
available to it to be able to pay other agents whenever this is required for a deal
that would increase social welfare. Concretely, if A is the initial allocation and
A0 is the allocation with maximal social welfare, then agent i may require an
amount of money just below the dierence ui(A0)   ui(A) to be able to get
through the negotiation process. In the context of task contracting, for which
this framework has been proposed originally [5], this may be justiable, at least if
we are mostly interested in the reallocation of tasks and consider `money' merely
a convenient way of keeping track of the utility transfers between friendly agents.
For resource allocation problems, on the other hand, it seems questionable to
make assumptions about the unlimited availability of one particular resource,
namely money.
64 Resource Allocation without Money
As argued before, making assumptions about the unlimited availability of money
to compensate other agents for disadvantageous deals is not realistic in all ap-
plication domains. In this section, we investigate, to what extent the theoretical
results of [5], which we have reproduced above, still apply for resource allocation
problems without money. (This is what Rosenschein and Zlotkin call negotiation
without \explicit utility transfer" [3].)
In scenarios without money, that is, if we do not allow for compensatory
payments, we cannot always guarantee an outcome with maximal social welfare.
This is, for instance, the case for the following simple problem:
Agent 1 Agent 2
A0(1) = frg A0(2) = fg
u1(fg) = 0 u2(fg) = 0
u1(frg) = 4 u2(frg) = 7
Here, passing r from agent 1 to agent 2 would increase social welfare by an
amount of 3. For the framework with money, agent 2 could pay agent 1, say,
the amount of 5:5 and the deal would be individually rational for both of them.
Without money, however, no deal is possible and negotiation must terminate
with a non-optimal allocation.
Pareto optimality. As maximising social welfare is not generally possible,
the next best thing would be to investigate whether a Pareto optimal outcome is
possible in the framework without money, and what types of deals are sucient
to guarantee this. In this context, we call A a Pareto optimal allocation i
there is no other allocation where social welfare is higher while no single agent
has lower utility,2 that is, i there exists no A0 such that sw(A) < sw(A0) and
ui(A)  ui(A0) for all i 2 A.
Individual rationality revisited. To get a suciency result, we need to
relax the notion of individual rationality a little. For scenarios without money,
we now also want agents to agree to a deal, if this at least maintains their utility
(i.e. no strict increase is necessary). However, we still require at least one agent
(say, the one proposing the deal) to strictly increase their utility. We call deals
of this type cooperative-individually rational, i.e.  = (A;A0) is cooperative-
individually rational i ui(A)  ui(A0) for all i 2 A and there exists a j 2 A
such that uj(A) < uj(A0).
Observe that, in analogy to Lemma 1, we still have sw(A) < sw(A0) for any
cooperative-individually rational deal  = (A;A0), but not vice versa.
2This formulation is equivalent to the more common one: \An agreement is Pareto optimal
if there is no other agreement [...] that is better for some of the agents and not worse for the
others." (quoted after [2]).
7Sucient deal types. The following result mirrors Theorem 1.
Theorem 3 (Sucient deals for Pareto optimality) Any sequence of
combined deals (without money) that are cooperative-individually rational will
culminate in a Pareto optimal allocation of resources.
Proof. Every cooperative-individually rational deal strictly increases social wel-
fare.3 Together with the fact that there are only nitely many allocations, this
implies that any negotiation will eventually terminate. For the sake of contra-
diction, assume negotiation ends with allocation A, but A is not Pareto optimal.
The latter means that there exists another allocation A0 with sw(A) < sw(A0)
and ui(A)  ui(A0) for all i 2 A. If we had ui(A) = ui(A0) for all i 2 A, then also
sw(A) = sw(A0), that is, there must be at least one j 2 A with uj(A) < uj(A0).
But then the deal  = (A;A0) would be cooperative-individually rational, which
contradicts our assumption of A being a terminal allocation. 2
Necessary deal types. As the following theorem shows, also for the frame-
work without money, each and every deal may be necessary in order to be able
to guarantee an optimal outcome of a negotiation (cf. Theorem 2).
Theorem 4 (Necessary deals for Pareto optimality) Let the sets of
agents and resources be xed. Then for every deal  there is a resource
allocation problem without money such that  is necessary to reach a Pareto
optimal allocation of resources.
Proof. Let  = (A;A0) with A 6= A0. We try to x utility functions ui in such
a way that A0 has the highest and A has the second highest social welfare, and
that ui(A)  ui(A0) for all agents i 2 A. As we have A 6= A0, there must be a
j 2 A such that A(j) 6= A0(j). We now dene utility functions as follows:
ui(R) =
8
<
:
2 if R = A0(i) or (R = A(i) and i 6= j)
1 if R = A(i) and i = j
0 otherwise
We get sw(A0) = 2jAj, sw(A) = sw(A0) 1, and sw(B) < sw(A) for all other
allocations B. We also have ui(A)  ui(A0) for all i 2 A. Hence, A is not
Pareto optimal, but A0 is. If we make A the initial allocation, then  would
be the only cooperative-individually rational deal (as every other deal would
decrease social welfare), i.e.  is indeed necessary to guarantee a Pareto optimal
outcome. 2
Observe that, while this proof has been very similar to the proof of Theorem 2,
now we also required the additional condition of ui(A)  ui(A0) for all i 2 A.
3This is where we need the condition that at least one agent behaves truly individually
rational for each deal.
85 Specic Utility Functions
In Section 2 we have dened utility functions as (arbitrary) functions from 2R to
R. For many application domains this degree of generality may be inappropriate
and we may be able to obtain stronger results for specic classes of utility
functions. In this section, we discuss some examples.
Clearly, the results on the suciency of the combined deal type (Theorems 1
and 3) will still apply, whatever restrictions we may put on utility functions.
Interesting new results would be either that the combined deal type is still
necessary, even for a restricted class of utility functions, or that a weaker deal
type is sucient for certain domains.
Non-negative and monotone utility. In general, there may be certain re-
sources we would like to assign a negative utility to (e.g. `ve tons of radioactive
waste'), but in many domains non-negative utility functions with ui(R)  0 for
all R  R will suce. All results on the necessity of deals still apply for scenarios
with non-negative utility functions (see proofs of Theorems 2 and 4).
A slightly stronger restriction would be to assign at least a small positive
value to every non-empty set of resources. We dene positive utility functions as
non-negative functions with ui(R) = 0 i R = fg. For positive utility functions,
Theorem 4 does not hold anymore, because any deal that would involve a par-
ticular agent giving away all its resources without receiving anything in return
could never be cooperative-individually rational (so it could not be necessary
either).
Another natural class of utility functions to consider would be the class of
monotone functions where R1  R2 implies ui(R1) < ui(R2). This would be
appropriate for domains where every additional resource is known to increase
utility at least a bit.
Additive utility. We call a a utility function ui additive i the value ascribed
to a set of resources is always the sum of the values of the single resources in
that set, i.e. i we have:
ui(R1 [ R2) = ui(R1) + ui(R2)   ui(R1 \ R2)
For domains with additive utility functions, the simple one-resource-at-a-time
deal type is sucient to guarantee outcomes with maximal social welfare in the
framework with money.4
Theorem 5 (Sucient deals in additive scenarios) If the utility func-
tions of all agents are additive, then any sequence of one-resource-at-a-time
deals (with money) that are individually rational will culminate in a resource
allocation with maximal social welfare.
4This has also been observed by T. Sandholm (personal communication).
9Proof. Termination is shown as for Theorem 1. We have to show that whenever
the current allocation A does not have maximal social welfare, then there still
exists a one-resource-at-a-time deal that is individually rational. In additive
domains we have sw(A) =
P
r2R ufA(r)(frg) where fA is the function mapping
every resource r 2 R to the agent i 2 A that holds r for allocation A (i.e.
r 2 A(i)). So if there is another allocation A0 with sw(A) < sw(A0) then there
must be at least one resource r 2 R with ufA(r)(frg) < ufA0(r)(frg). But then
passing r from agent fA(r) on to agent fA0(r) would be a one-resource-at-a-time
deal that is individually rational, i.e. A cannot be terminal. 2
0-1 utility. We call an additive utility function 0-1 i every single resource
has either utility 0 or 1. This may be sucient if we simply wish to distinguish
whether or not an agent needs a particular resource (to execute a given plan, for
example). This is, for instance, the case for some of the agents dened in [4]. As
the following theorem shows, for this kind of domain, the one-resource-at-a-time
deal type is even sucient to guarantee maximal social welfare in the framework
without money.
Theorem 6 (Sucient deals in 0-1 scenarios) If the utility functions of
all agents are 0-1, then any sequence of one-resource-at-a-time deals (without
money) that are cooperative-individually rational will culminate in a resource
allocation with maximal social welfare.
Proof. Termination is shown as for Theorem 3. If an allocation A does not have
maximal social welfare then it must be the case that an agent i holds a resource
r with ui(frg) = 0 and there is another agent j in the system with uj(frg) = 1.
Passing r from i to j would be a cooperative-individually rational deal, so either
negotiation has not yet terminated or we are in a situation with maximal social
welfare. 2
Global utility. As a nal remark in this section, we point out that we may
also use appropriate utility functions to model (limited amounts of) money
explicitly. This can be achieved by forcing the utility functions of all the agents
in the system to have the same global value for certain sets of resources, namely
those that represent money.
6 Conclusions
Theoretical results. We believe that the main contribution of this paper
lies in the transfer of Sandholm's results on necessary and sucient conditions
for optimal outcomes in negotiation scenarios with money (as reported in [5])
to a framework without money. This involved replacing the notion of (strict)
individual rationality with the notion of cooperative-individual rationality, and
the optimality criterion of maximal social welfare with the weaker concept of
Pareto optimality. The technical results here are Theorems 3 and 4 on the
suciency of combined deals and the necessity of all deals, respectively.
10The results reported in Section 5 on sucient deal types for domains with
very specic utility functions are rather basic at this stage. Still, we believe, that
this could be a very fruitful area for future research. At the moment, theoretical
results fall into two extremes: On the one hand, we know that in the general
case only the very powerful combined deals are sucient to guarantee optimal
outcomes. On the other hand, we have examples for specic scenarios where
the very simple one-resource-at-a-time deal type is sucient. The truly exciting
results would lie somewhere in between: Is there a class of utility functions for
which cluster deals (or multiagent deals) are sucient (and necessary)? Or the
other way round: given a class of deals, for what kind of domains (i.e. utility
functions) will this class be sucient to guarantee optimal outcomes?
Protocol design. While the results reported here are rather abstract, they
can still have very practical implications. They may, for instance, provide
guidelines for the design of concrete protocols for reallocative negotiation
scenarios. For example, if the application domain in question can be modelled
in terms of additive or even 0-1 utility functions, then Theorems 5 and 6 tell us
that it would be inappropriate to allow for dialogue moves for proposing, say,
swap deals. At the other end of the spectrum, for domains where we cannot
make any strong assumptions on the nature of utility functions, Theorems 2
and 4 show that, ideally, a good protocol should enable agents to agree on any
kind of deal.
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